What to Expect during Election Week: Uncertainty, Rumor-Gathering, and Lawsuits
What to Expect during Election Week: Uncertainty, Rumor-Gathering, and Lawsuits
The "What to Expect When We’re Electing" Series
By Kate Starbird, Danielle Lee Tomson, Joseph S. Schafer, Ashlyn B. Aske, Melinda McClure Haughey, Rachel Moran-Prestridge, Emma S. Spiro, and Michael Grass
Key Takeaways
On Election Day, we can expect to see dozens or even hundreds of rumors emerge as the events of the day — likely to include both real and perceived issues, mistakes, irregularities, and disputes — are documented and shared online. These rumors are likely to echo familiar tropes and align with common themes, e.g. around perceived voter fraud.
Rumoring about voting and election administration may be even more intense this cycle, because many Americans have been primed through ongoing exposure to election fraud narratives to think that the election will be “rigged” or stolen.
This electoral cycle, robust organizational, legal, and digital infrastructure is in place to persuade audiences that election fraud is occurring, capture alleged “evidence” of it, and use that evidence to contest the results.
Rumoring will likely be widespread and diffuse on Election Day, before consolidating around core themes and specific stories as polls close, results come in, and candidates and political influencers weigh the value of different rumors for advancing their political aims.
As we approach Election Day on November 5, the uncertainty — and anxiety — are palpable. The stakes are high, with close races likely to determine control of the U.S. presidency, Senate, and House of Representatives. Outcomes are inherently, and in this case acutely, uncertain. Polls suggest that nationally-significant races, including for president, will be extremely close. Slow counts are expected in some key swing states, potentially extending the period of uncertainty. Additionally, audiences are primed to see election events through the lens of presumed voter fraud.
All of this sets the stage for a period of intense rumoring on Election Day and the days after as votes are tallied and winners determined.
In 2020, we expected and then witnessed a concerted effort by Republicans, in particular, to gather and assemble “evidence” of perceived voter fraud into rumors, which were subsequently used to mobilize political action and challenge election results. On October 26, 2020 in the Election Integrity Partnership blog, we explained what we anticipated seeing on that Election Day:
As we grapple with the civic exercise of tens of millions of voters and votes, a crowd of self-deployed volunteers will be documenting and sharing their experiences — acting as unofficial poll observers and (perhaps unwittingly) gathering evidence that may be used by ongoing disinformation campaigns. On the Republican side, some of these efforts have been explicitly organized. President Trump and his surrogates have made repeated calls for an “army” of poll watchers to help collect evidence to support their claims of voter fraud. These volunteers, armed with mobile phones, cameras, and social media accounts, will generate terabytes of crowdsourced evidence to support claims of voter suppression and voting irregularities. Some will livestream to social networks, airing complaints and inciting audiences already primed to be concerned. The collection of evidence will be assembled, framed, and amplified by networks of social media influencers, hyper-partisan media, and political actors — to push false narratives that paint a picture of widespread voter fraud in order to cast doubt on the results of the election.
As we approach Election Day 2024, our predictions are similar, however, there are three key differences impacting our forecast this year:
Priming and loss of trust: Many voters have been primed to see elections as unfair and potentially rigged. Partisan election observers have been recruited and trained upon that premise, a dynamic which is likely to lead to misinterpretations (e.g. of mundane election procedures as evidence of fraud) and subsequent false rumors.
Mature evidence generation infrastructure: The organizational and technical infrastructure for collecting “evidence” and converting it into misleading claims about untrustworthy elections and election fraud is far more mature in 2024, as is the human infrastructure — i.e., the networks of collaborating operatives and organizations — for mobilizing that evidence into lawsuits that attempt to change how votes are counted and/or contest results.
Non-citizen voting rumors: A focus on the legitimacy of mail-in ballots in 2020 has largely been replaced by a refrain about allegedly widespread “non-citizen voting” in 2024. Though historical data shows non-citizen voting to be extremely rare and electorally inconsequential, political operatives and activists have been incentivized to create “evidence” that can be used to support that false narrative.
Expanding upon these insights, and drawing upon decades-old scholarship about rumoring, in this post we describe some of the key information dynamics and rumors we expect to see on Election Day 2024 and during the subsequent days as votes are tallied and winners determined.
The Backdrop: Primed to Believe in and Look for Election Fraud
One factor in rumoring this year is widespread, established skepticism about the integrity of U.S. elections. Despite being consistently disproven in courts, rumors about voter fraud in previous cycles have built a foundational belief among some voters — particularly Republicans as polls show — that the upcoming election will be “rigged.” And this belief has, in turn, become a powerful lens or “frame” through which many people view the events of Election Day, contributing to misinterpretations that can catalyze rumors.
The growing skepticism towards election integrity is not organic, but instead reflects a political strategy. It has been fostered by political leaders, amplified by online influencers, and is now supported by an increasingly sophisticated infrastructure for tracking and reporting “evidence” of election fraud, as discussed in our recent report on election generation infrastructure. Volunteers have been trained to approach the work of election observation through this skeptical lens. Election skeptics have been recruited to apply to be election workers. Apps, websites, and other tools have been developed to encourage voters and poll watchers to document irregularities or concerns. Lawyers stand at the ready to convert this “evidence” into lawsuits requesting changes to processes or contesting results. — for candidates or voters.
An incredibly tight race makes accepting defeat harder — for candidates or voters. Given Trump has previously questioned or rejected the validity of results in both 2016 and 2020, it is possible he will question or reject them again.
Election Day: Strategic Amplification of Concern and Confusion
Election Day 2024 is likely to be one of incredible uncertainty and anxiety — both of which are known to drive the rumor mill. Millions of voters have already cast their ballots via mail or early in-person voting, but the majority of voters are still expected to vote on Election Day. Election Day is also the last day to mail and/or return mail-in ballots. The results may remain uncertain for some time, especially with narrow margins expected in key states. Media attention will be intense with election coverage hitting every media vertical from fashion to real estate. News outlets of all kinds will be reporting on the returns and predicting the outcome, often visualized through interactive maps with live and changing data. Additionally, content creators, voters, and influential online accounts will be eager to document and highlight concerns about the integrity and/or fairness of the process.
Rumors about Election Administration Errors and Voting Glitches
Under these circumstances, it is likely that there will be thousands of rumors circulating on (and off) social media. Rumors will take shape around reports of suspicious people or actions, election administration “glitches” or errors, and sometimes contentious interactions between voters, election workers, and election observers. There will also be unfounded speculation, for example about large numbers of non-citizen voters and complicated voter fraud schemes.
We expect the most common type of rumor will focus on real or perceived problems with voting. Rumors we have seen this year and in past elections include materials shortages, malfunctioning machines, and ballots that are not printed correctly – to name only a few. Though the core issues described may turn out to be true, misleading rumors can be built around them by exaggerating their impact, obscuring (or challenging) the available remedies, and/or falsely claiming that the issues are intentional.
Rumors that feature compelling evidence — such as photos, videos, “eyewitness reports”, and “friend of a friend” claims — are also likely to get attention and spread further than others. Many of these rumors, (e.g., false claims that Sharpie pens were disenfranchising voters in 2020) will stem from genuine concern or confusion. But some will result from intentional mischaracterizations of real evidence (e.g., video shared by Rudy Giuliani of election workers he falsely alleged were engaged in fraud; later he was ordered to pay $148M in damages as a result of a defamation case). In rare cases, we may see manipulated or fabricated evidence introduced as part of purposeful efforts to mislead. (For a more detailed discussion of these dynamics see our previous post on the five ways that evidence-based rumors mislead.)
Rumors about Emergency Closures and Damaged Dropboxes
We may also see rumors around emergency closures of poll locations, changes to voting locations, and/or reports of damaged ballot dropboxes that suggest these are intentional and meant to disenfranchise voters or provide cover for a voter fraud scheme.
Unfortunately, some of these rumors may have some truth behind them. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has warned about potential attacks on ballot dropboxes, and in recent days we have seen credible reports of arson targeting ballot boxes in Washington state and Oregon , which are likely politically-motivated, though the exact motives are still unclear. Cases like these where voting is actually disrupted and/or ballots are damaged may be used to contest outcomes during the vote-counting period. When covering these events and the rumors that take shape around them, it will be important to consider how the issues can or cannot be remedied, how the issues are later adjudicated in courts, and whether the numbers of affected votes have the potential to impact outcomes.
Fortunately, many of the rumors flowing from incidents of voting disruptions — especially those that levy accusations of political intent — will turn out to be false or misleading. For example, in 2022 we saw rumors around two emergency closures of voting locations that alleged they were politically-motivated attempts to disenfranchise voters. The first closure was actually due to an electrical accident, the second due to a bomb threat on a school that coincidentally functioned as a polling place; the threat was unrelated to the election.
Rumors about Voter Intimidation and Potential Political Violence
There may also be rumors about intimidation or violence at the polls. These rumors may include claims of harassment or voter intimidation by protesters, unofficial election observers, law enforcement, and others. For example, we could see rumors of Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents patrolling near polling locations, which may instill fear among naturalized citizens or citizens with undocumented family members and discourage them from voting — particularly given the extra scrutiny this cycle placed on recently naturalized voters alleging that they are non-citizens. In previous election cycles, there have been reports of armed ballot box observers, which can also incite rumors that can impact turnout.
Rumors about potential violence at the polls can be particularly challenging to address. Though some of these incidents may be based on real threats, others threats could be exaggerated or completely fabricated. When true, these rumors can help voters take protective action and spur law enforcement to move quickly to address the issues. However, when false, these rumors — which are sometimes spread by people who are politically aligned with the targeted groups — can unnecessarily suppress votes by discouraging people from voting. Sometimes, these rumors of threats of political violence have turned out to be part of foreign disinformation campaigns.
Members of either party could leverage incidents of rumored voter intimidation to argue that the election process was unfair or disenfranchising. Evidence of intimidation or suppression — whether real, exaggerated, or misinterpreted — could be used to draw attention to alleged flaws in the electoral system, further deepening public mistrust.
Rumors around Challenges and Altercations at the Polls
It is also possible that conflicts will arise between poll observers and election workers — for example around where observers are allowed to observe proceedings, whether specific people are barred from being poll watchers, how many observers are allowed in counting rooms, and whether observers can take photographs. If they do occur, altercations will likely prompt rumors, for example about workers allegedly “covering up” negligence or malfeasance. For instance, in 2020, when additional poll watchers were not permitted to enter a Detroit vote counting center that was already over capacity, videos documenting the ensuing chaos spread on social media, fueling rumors that officials were covering up fraud. Rumors like this, which spread after the 2020 election, have also primed some communities to believe voting fraud is being perpetuated by election workers, sparking threats and intimidation against them.
Rumors are also likely to spread about conflicts between election workers and voters. For example, in this election, we have already seen multiple instances of altercations between election workers and voters. These may be captured on video and misinterpreted or mischaracterized in online forums and partisan media. Video evidence of altercations from previous elections may resurface as well. We saw this in Texas in 2022 with a video of a primary poll worker telling a voter they couldn’t vote in the Republican primary due to a staffing shortage; it resurfaced during the general election, with misinterpretations alleging that the worker was telling the voter they could not vote Republican at all.
Rumors around Voter Challenges
Many states allow private citizens — including those acting as poll observers — to challenge the eligibility of other voters, and in recent years political organizations have developed strategies for supporting challenges targeting likely voters of opposing parties. Efforts to submit mass challenges to voters’ eligibility based on flawed analyses of public voter records have been well-documented this year. Some of these challenges may result in the erroneous removal of eligible voters from the rolls, or potentially contentious challenges to would-be voters while at the polls. Where successful, challenges have the potential of causing confusion on Election Day. Voters who unexpectedly find that they are not registered may be required to cast provisional ballots, leading to shock, frustration, and speculation about an unfair process. Eyewitness accounts and video testimonials of these incidents could garner significant attention, along with speculation about their causes and impacts. Large numbers of provisional ballots — resulting from challenges as well as other causes — could lead to later legal efforts to determine which ballots are counted and which excluded, with rumors feeding and flowing from these processes. Republicans have already asked the U.S. Supreme Court to block some provisional ballots in Pennsylvania.
Assembling Evidence to Fit Claims of Voter Fraud
On social media, “newsbrokering” political influencers will work to find and strategically amplify rumors and underlying evidence that supports claims of a “rigged election.” This attention means that primed voters, poll watching volunteers, and content creators are motivated to share content that can be used to “demonstrate” election fraud. Some of this will happen “organically” on social media as users share personal experiences, but political operatives have also deployed dedicated infrastructure to train volunteers and collect reports of Election Day issues — which they can then share online and blend into broader efforts to question and potentially challenge the election results.
Because voters will be casting ballots all around the country, the geography of election-day rumoring is likely to be distributed across space and time. However, rumors that center swing states are likely to receive more attention than others (e.g., recent rumors in Pennsylvania) due to the high stakes of these outcomes. Similarly, political operatives are most likely to attend to — and political influencers most likely to amplify — the rumors that would be the most impactful on election results in key races. The most viral rumors on Election Day will be those that would be “Big, If True,” to quote one voter fraud influencer in 2020.
Counting Period: Rumors Crystalize around Specific Details and Themes
The 2024 election is predicted to be close, and key races likely won’t be decided on Election Night. Due to expected narrow margins and potential delays in final results — especially in states that restrict mail-in ballots from being processed and/or counted until after polls close — there is likely to be an extended period of uncertainty in outcomes after the polls close. Unfortunately, long periods of uncertainty and anxiety create fertile ground for both organic rumors and strategic exploitation.
The rumor mill will continue to churn. People will continue to post “evidence” to social media about their own and others’ experiences with voting on Election Day. Poll observers will contribute their stories about perceived issues and suspected malfeasance during the voting and vote counting periods. Political influencers and partisan media will continue to gather/amplify these stories across social media platforms, talking to and collaborating with their audiences in a “collective sensemaking” exercise of what happened and what it means. In that iterative process, details may drop and compelling stories or evidence will become more salient or expedient to a political message, potentially all converging around a larger narrative that the election was rigged — processes that rumor scholars describe as leveling and sharpening. Political operatives, candidates, and elected leaders may amplify rumors and integrate them into their own public statements on social media and beyond. The enthusiasm around these efforts will depend upon the anticipated outcome of specific races (which may change over time). Premature calls of victory — by candidates, influencers, or news outlets — could also be vectors for rumoring and even accusations of malfeasance.
Shifting Counts will Fuel Rumors about Foul Play
As the polls close, network and cable news media will settle into the horse race coverage of Election Night, featuring exit polls and periodically updated, unofficial vote counts. These changing counts — and the publicly available data they draw from — will provide fodder for speculative rumors about large influxes of ballots (“vote dumps”), dramatic shifts in vote share (e.g., when large, politically homogeneous counties update their counts), and other perceived anomalies. Photos of unofficial counts during news broadcasts, screenshots of online dashboards, and visualizations created by armchair statisticians will serve as visual content for data-driven rumors alleging fraud. Many of these statistics-based rumors result from misinterpretations of the underlying data — both bad assumptions about what the data represent and invalid or poorly executed analyses or generalizations. Split-ticket voting may also be framed to indicate some kind of fraud.
Anticipated delays in states where the law restricts processing mail-in ballots until after the polls close — including a few key swing states (e.g., Pennsylvania and Wisconsin) — will likely lead to larger volumes of and more focused rumors. Additionally, due to party differences in mail-in voting patterns (historically, Democrats have been more likely to vote by mail), it is possible that vote shares will shift over time. These Blue Mirage/Red Mirage effects are likely to be less intense than they were in 2020, but they could still lead to rumors that view shifts in vote share as suspicious. (For more information about when polls close and how long counting may take in each state, see this helpful Washington Post resource).
Rumors about Malfeasance in the Vote-Counting Process
During the vote-counting process, we also expect to see rumors emerge accusing election officials of bias or malfeasance. Photos, videos, or eyewitness reports, often taken out of context or intentionally manipulated, could be used to falsely claim that the election officials are altering or discarding ballots. In some cases, surveillance footage may be selectively edited or misinterpreted to support these allegations. Human errors in the vote counting process — that are ultimately remedied — may lead to rumoring of malfeasance.
Where margins are close in key races, candidates or political groups that already subscribe to the “rigged election” narrative may begin organizing protests at vote counting centers to draw attention to or even disrupt vote counting. This concern has precedent, for example the Brooks Brothers Riot in 2000 and “Stop The Steal” rallies near vote counting facilities in 2022. We anticipate that these organized protests are most likely to show up in large battleground counties (Maricopa in Arizona and Luzerne in Pennsylvania) and blue cities in swing states (Detroit, Atlanta). After disruptive protests in 2020, Detroit has taken protective action in 2024, for example by moving vote counting to a less visible location. These kinds of changes will boost security for election workers and ensure a smoother process, but may contribute to allegations of “cover ups”.
Early Calls and Claims of Victory — Legitimate or Not — Could Lead to Heightened Skepticism
In contrast to 2020, many voters now expect results to take time, so early calls of victory — whether well-founded or premature — could fuel skepticism. Conversely, delayed calls could extend uncertainty, and thus rumoring. Although news outlets use sophisticated models to project winners, the public may still perceive early declarations of victory as rash, leading to suspicions about media bias or manipulation. For example, Fox News’ early call of Biden winning Arizona (which, even though ultimately correct, was viewed as premature) contributed to rumors about a “rigged election” in 2020. Skepticism can also emerge if different outlets project different outcomes or don’t project the wins at the same time. In cases where the election or certain counties can be projected before the vast majority of the votes are in, we expect the media to be a target of rumors alleging a ‘fixed’ process. Mistakes around calls of election winners can also lead to rumoring, such as Fox10 Phoenix’s inadvertent airing of a graphic that showed a winner of the election before Election Day in 2022, in a broadcast test.
Premature claims of victory by candidates themselves could also escalate tensions. As happened in 2020, there is concern that some candidates may declare victory before enough votes have been counted, setting the stage for future accusations of a "stolen" election if the final outcome differs. When candidates contradict official results or media projections, it deepens public skepticism, fueling partisan narratives of election rigging.
Continued Spotlight on the Swing States
As the votes are counted, media coverage and public scrutiny will intensify on key swing states, especially where margins are close. Certain counties in these battleground states have historically been hotspots for election rumors and misinformation (e.g. Maricopa County, Arizona and Fulton County, Georgia). Areas like Maricopa County and Luzerne County, Pennsylvania are already receiving heightened attention — in part produced by partisan influencers — because of previous issues, real and/or perceived. Additionally, election officials in Maricopa County have already commented that an extra long ballot this election could cause delays, and thus, rumors. We expect to see these continue as the election draws to a close. Other cities that have been the focal points of past election controversies — such as Detroit, Atlanta, Milwaukee, Madison, and Philadelphia — are also expected to be at the center of rumors and downstream political action. Pennsylvania, in particular, may be a state to watch, as laws restricting the processing of mail-in ballots will likely delay results in that potentially critical state, creating windows of opportunity for both organic rumors and strategic manipulation.
After the Election Is Called: Potential Certification Battles
After Election Day, the rumors and misinformation that circulated will likely be repurposed to fuel contestation, protests, and legal battles. New rumors may add to ongoing lawsuits or motivate new ones as legal teams seek “evidence” and witnesses to support claims of fraud, often relying on misinterpretations from voters and poll observers. These affidavits, based on incomplete or distorted views, could be used to challenge the legitimacy of the election. Protests may also erupt in key locations, such as capitol buildings of states where vote counts are close, or where rumors of impropriety have gained significant traction (as seen in 2020). This lawfare — strategic legal challenges aimed at contesting the results — will likely unfold across the country, further amplifying contested election narratives.
We will dive deeper into these post-election dynamics in an upcoming installment of our “What to Expect When We’re Electing” series, where we’ll explore how these rumors have been and will be leveraged to influence public perception and the legal landscape.
Previously:
Part 1: “What to expect when we’re electing: An election rumoring timeline”
Part 2: “What to expect when we’re electing: The 5 moves of misleading election rumors”
Part 3: “What to expect when we’re electing: An object-oriented framework for pre-election rumors”
Kate Starbird is a University of Washington Center for an Informed Public co-founder and professor in the UW Department of Human Centered Design & Engineering.
Danielle Lee Tomson is the CIP’s research manager.
Joseph S. Schafer is a CIP graduate research assistant and HCDE doctoral student.
Ashlyn B. Aske is a CIP graduate research assistant and a Master of Jurisprudence student at the UW School of Law.
Melinda McClure Haughey is a CIP graduate research assistant and HCDE doctoral candidate.
Rachel Moran-Prestridge is a CIP senior research scientist and a UW Information School affiliate assistant professor.
CIP director Emma S. Spiro is a UW Information School associate professor.
Michael Grass is the CIP’s assistant director for communications.